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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Respondentf s 
-vs~ 
FARHAD SOROUSHIRN, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No* 
14421 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged with possession of a controlled 
substance, to-wits marijuana, a misdemeanor, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann* § 58-37-8(2) (a) (i) (1953), as amended. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried before a jury and was found guilty 
on December 15f 1975, in the Second Judicial District Court, the 
Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde, presiding* On December 15f 1975f the 
trial court fined appellant $100.00* 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an order of this Court affirming the 
judgment of the jury and the fine of the trial court. 
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i 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On July 2 and 3, 1975, Mrc Djafar Tawakolif a former 
Persian student at Weber State College, made arrangements for 
terminating his tenancy of apartment No* 119 at the Warren 
House Apartments in Ogden City? Utah (Tre20-32,94-99,102-105, 
I 
109,111-113). Beth Weinle, then assistant manager of the apart-
ment house, testified that on July 2* 1975, Djafar checked out 
of his room by giving her two keys to his roonu one mail box 
4 
key and one door keyc At that time, she testified he told her 
he was moving out (Tr.21-24,27,28)« Although Mrc Tawakoli 
denied turning in his door key on July 2, 1975, he did testify 
4 
that on that date he went to the managerfs office, turned in 
his mail box key and paid the assistant manager $12*00 rent 
for the last two days he resided in room 119 (Tr.97,104,111-113)• 
Ms* Weinle, the assistant manager, testified she 
then told the maid to go to room 119 and clean it (Tre23)« 
She was unclear as to exactly which day the maid did clean 
(Tre24,26,27,29) , although the maid testified she thought she 
first went to the room on July 3, 1975 (Tre38)c Geraidine 
Brown, the maid, stated when she went to the apartment, she 
noticed that there were some personal items in it, so she 
relocked the door and informed the assistant manager, Ed 
Weinle, of the situation (Tr.33,34)c The manager of the -
apartments, Donna Merryman, later that day instructed Ms* 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Brown to return to the apartment and inventory the items 
according to the standard procedure when a former tenant 
leaves items behind (Trc34)o 
During this inventory *> Ms* Brown testified they 
found a plastic bag which looked Bfiawful funny" and a cloth 
bag which also aroused her suspicions (Tr«34,35,40,41)* She 
further testified that the manager told her to find the 
police officers who also lived in the apartment house, which 
she did? leaving the bags on the kitchen counter (Tr*35,36,41)« 
She and the two officer returned shortly, she testified, and 
then she left (Trc36,37,41). 
Joseph William G8Keefe, a patrolman with the Ogden 
City Police Department, testified that he and his roommate 
James Robert McKinley, went with Ms. Brown to room 119 
where he opened a plastic baggie and opined that it was 
"definitely marijuana*86 (Tr«42-44r52) . OfKeefe testified he 
learned from Mrsc Merryman that the apartment had been vacated 
by a Persian student who had just left for Persia (Tr.44)» He 
stated he then searched the apartment, discovering yet 
another plastic bag containing what he believed to be marijuana 
(Tr.44,45,54,55,56)e 0*Keefe testified he put the bags on the 
counter along with the cloth bag whose contents he could not 
identify, and then went to call the Ogden City Police Department 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Narcotics Squad (Tr.45)e While he was doing sof he testified 
Jerry Merryman came to tell him that persons unknown to him 
were removing items from apartment 119 and placing them in 
a vehicle in front of the apartment (Tr.46)c According to 
his testimony9 O'Keefe approached one of the men coming down 
the stairway and asked him what he was doingf to which the 
man responded that he was helping a friend move and that 
his friend had returned to Persia (Tr«46)c OfKeefe said 
that he and Mr* Merryman then went up to the apartment 
where he saw the man identified as the appellant, Farhad 
Soroushirn, inside the room (Tr*46,47). When asked by 
O'Keefe what he was doing there, the appellant responded 
that he had come to pick up his friendfs possessions (Trt47). 
At that pointv the officer testified Mr« Merryman indicated 
that the "stuff's gone1* (Tro47,48)r whereupon OfKeefe observed 
that the two plastic baggies had been removed from the counter 
(Tr048K O'Keefe testified that he asked both men what 
happened to the marijuana9 to which they both responded 
Mthey had no idea what we were talking aboutf that they had 
not seen any marijuana*18 (Tr*48)e According to his 
testimonyf O'Keefe identified himself as a police officer 
and gave them the Miranda warningf taking time to explain 
each portion of it to them (Tr*48f58)* O'Keefe testified 
he told them they were trespassing at which point the other 
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person stated he had not entered the apartment, "that 
Mr. Soroushirn was loading the boses (sic) and personal 
items up and placing them in the hall*, and that the 
other gentleman was taking them from the hall and trans-
porting them to the car*? and Mrc Soroushirn agreed with 
that statement*" (Tr.49)« 
OfKeefe testified he then asked the appellant 
and the other man to return all the items to the apartment 
house that had been placed in the vehicle. He then called 
for a patrolman* Officer Soakai, the patrolman,responded 
to the call. After Mr* 0BKeefe signed a citizen's 
complaint against the appellant, Officer Soakai read the 
Miranda warning to him (Tr.91) and took him to the 
police station (Tr.79K 
James Robert McKinley, a reserve police officer 
and state liquor narcotics agent at the time of this 
incident, testified that he went with Officer 0*Keefe to 
room 119 when called by Ms* Brown* and that he left the 
apartment temporarily while Mr. OfKeefe had gone to call 
the police, returning to find O'Keefe talking with the 
appellant and his partner (Tr.67,68)c After he was 
informed that the baggies were gone, he testified he 
started to look for them, eventually finding them enclosed 
in the cavity of a tape recorder in a box in the apartment 
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(Tr«68,69,70)• According to McKinley^s testimony, when he 
asked the appellant if he knew whose tape recorder it was he 
denied owning it (Tr.69K 
Two days later, according to Mr. McKinley, while 
he was doing some maintenance work for Warren Apartments, 
the appellant approached him asking, "Why did you do this to 
me, brother? or something like that**6 (Trt71)c McKinley 
said he answered B8because itss my job" (Tr*85) and that 
if the appellant had at first been truthful, the matter 
may not have gone as far as it did. The appellant responded, 
"Well, if I had of told you the truth then I would have got 
in trouble," according to Mr* McKinley and further indicated 
that the tape recorder was his but he had loaned it to his 
friend (Tr*72,85,87-89)• 
The appellant then stated he did not own the 
marijuana but admitted putting the marijuana in the back of 
the tape recorder, according to Mrc McKinleyfs testimony 
(Tr.73-74)* 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY ADMITTED THE INCRIMINATING 
TESTIMONY OF WITNESS JAMES ROBERT McKINLEY* 
In the pretrial hearing on the date of his trial, 
the appellant moved to suppress incriminating statements made 
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to one of the State's witnesses, James Robert McKinley, one 
of the two men called to room 119 by the maid of the Warren 
Apartments to look at the suspicious looking items discovered 
therein,, This motion was argued and subsequently denied by the 
trial court (Tr^-lS), and later renewed and reargued by the 
appellant when the jury retired to determine the verdict$ 
again denied by the trial court (Tr.132-137)c 
Appellant contends that the state has the burden of 
showing that incriminating statements were voluntarily given 
before they are admissiblef relying on State v. Dunkleyr 
85 Utah 546, 39 P.2d 1097 (1935). In Dunkley, the Utah 
Supreme Court held that the State has the burden of showing 
the voluntariness of a confession before determining its 
admissiblity* In the case at bar, the incriminating 
statements made to Mr. McKinley fail to constitute a full-
blown confession but respondent will discuss the case regard-
less because it supports the trial courtfs ruling. Dunkley 
requires that where there, is a question as to the voluntariness 
of statements, a hearing should be held before the court in 
the absence of the jury to determine the issue* In the instant 
case, this hearing was held pursuant to the motion to suppress 
made by the appellant (Trc4-61 and renewed 132-137). Several 
pages of argument and testimony satisifed the Dunkley burden 
on the prosecution. Appellant claims that Mr. McKinley 
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"concealed" his identity as a reserve officer in cm attempt 
to "coerce9 confuse9 deceive and trick" hiitu Appellant 
further claims that because of Mr* McKinleyfs actions 
he did not voluntarily give his statements because he did 
not voluntarily waive his right not to speakc 
Quite to the contrary9 the record is replete with 
testimony that Mr* McKinley did not try to "conceal" his 
identity or in any other way attempt to "coerce, confuser 
deceive or trick" the appellantc Mr* McKinley testified 
that he recalled informing the appellant of his identity 
when the appellant approached him two days after his arrest 
(Tr.77,85). Further, Mr0 McKinley in no way misrepresented 
his position to the appellant because it was he who made the 
citizen's arrest and the appellant knew thisf thereby 
aware that Mr. McKinley was not disposed towards hiitw 
Moreover9 this was not Mr* McKinleyfs investigation? in 
factf he was off duty at the time of this incident, he being 
assigned to undercover work in Southern Utah (Tr.74-75)* 
He and O'Keefe were asked to the apartment but they were 
off duty and assisted only until the on-duty officer arrived. 
Although it is true that Mr. McKinley did not give 
the appellant a Miranda warning (Tr.77), the appellant was 
advised of his rights by two different individuals when he 
was arrested, first by Mr.. O'Keefe (Tr.4-8,58), and then by 
Officer Soakai (Tr.91)* When asked if he understood the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Miranda warning given and explained to him, the appellant 
stated that he did (Tr.49,58)« Miranda v. Arizona, 
384 UoS. 436/16 LeEd.2d 694, 86 SeCte 1602 (1966), dealt 
with the problem of police-custodial and police-dominated 
interrogations, holding that where a suspect has been taken 
into custody or is in a police-dominated atmosphere, the 
police may not use any statements made by the suspect in 
the absence of procedural safeguards to secure the Fifth 
Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination. The 
United States Supreme Court further held that these 
procedural safeguards are necessary to ensure that any 
statement made was truly the product of the suspectfs 
free choice and not compelled by the atmosphere of the 
custodial interrogation itselfi 
"« * * the prosecution may not use 
statements, whether exculpatory or 
inculpatory, stemming from custodial 
interrogation of the defendant unless it 
demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards 
effective to secure the privilege against 
self-incrimination* By custodial interrogation, 
we mean questioning initiated by law enforce-
ment officers after a person has been taken 
into custody or otherwise deprived of his 
freedom of action in any significant way. As 
for the procedural safeguards to be employed, 
unless other full effective means are devised 
to inform accused persons of their right of 
silence and to assure a continuous opportunity 
-9-
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i 
< 
to exercise it, the following measures 
are requiredc Prior to any questioningr 
the person must be warned that he has a 
right to remain silent, that any state-
ment he does make may be used as evidence 
against him, and that he has a right to 
the presence of an attorney, either retained 
or appointedc The defendant may waive 
effectuation of these rights, provided 
the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly 
and intelligentlyc If, howeverf he indicates 
in any manner and at any stage of the process 
that he wishes to consult with an attorney 
before speaking there can be no questioning. 
Likewise, if the individual is alone and 
indicates in any manner that he does not wish 
to be interrogated, the police may not question 
hiiru The mere fact that he may have answered 
some questions or volunteered some statements 
on his own does not deprive him of the right 
to refrain from answering any further inquiries 
until he has consulted with an attorney and 
thereafter consents to be questioned.". 
436 UoS* at 444,445c 
The cases decided in the Miranda decision all shared 
salient features—"incommunicado interrogation of individuals 
in a police-dominated atmosphere, resulting in incriminating 
statements without full warnings of constitutional rights.* 
Idc at 445. 
The case at bar is clearly distinguishable from the 
cases before the Court in Miranda* Here, the appellant was 
advised of his constitutional rights not once but twice. 
Even if appellant should argue what constituted his custody, 
he cannot escape the fact that Mr. O'Keefe advised him of his 
-10-
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rights as soon as it became apparent the appellant might 
be in possession of the marijuana. Moreoverf appellant 
was given the Miranda warning a second time when he was 
arrested and taken into custody by Officer Soakai* 
Appellants contention that Mr* McKinleyfs failure to 
give the appellant an additional Miranda warning overlooks 
the fact that the Miranda decision does not require every 
person talking with the suspect to individually and separately 
advise him of his rights. FurtherP Mr. McKinley testified 
that he did not feel obligated to give the Miranda warning 
(To77) only reinforces his viewpoint that he was not conducting 
an investigation but that he was merely giving off-duty 
assistance in a situation that demanded his aid. Mr. 
McKinley was present when Mr. O'Keefe advised the appellant 
of his rights so he knew that the appellant had been apprised 
of his constitutional protections (Tr.77)» 
Appellant argues that the statements the appellant 
made to Mr. McKinley two days after his arrest should also 
have been suppressed on various grounds including that the 
statements Efstemmed81 from the original custodial interrogation 
and that somehow Mr. McKinley was misrepresenting his interest 
in the case. These arguments are bankrupt for several reasons: 
(1) Miranda v. Arizona, supra, concerns custodial or police-
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dominated atmosphere * In this case, the record reveals that 
the second encounter between Mr* McKinley and the appellant 
occurred at the Warren Apartments and were initiated by the 
appellant* This is clearly not the kind of atmosphere con-
sidered in Mirandao 
(2) In two recent decisions, the Utah Supreme 
Court has addressed the question of what to do in the 
situation in which a suspect states he wants to remain silent 
but then reinitiates conversation with the police and mak6s 
incriminating statements• In State v. Easthope, 29 Utah 2d 
400, 510 Pe2d 933 (1973), this Court decided that where a 
defendant had first stated he did not want to make a statement 
and that he wanted to see a lawyer and then asked the reason 
for his arrest, the incriminating statements he made 
following the policemanss answer were not protected because 
he had voluntarily made the statements after having been 
informed of his rights* 
State Ve Sims, 30 Utah 2d 251, 516 P*2d 354 (1973), 
discusses a similar situations the defendant called an 
attorney but nevertheless told the officers to wgo ahead" 
with their questions, thereby waiving his privilege by 
voluntarily answering their questions. 
-12-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(3) There is some testimony that Mr* McKinley 
informed the appellant of his occupation as reserve 
police officer and state liquor narcotics agent at this 
time^ so it is difficult to see how Mrt McKinley "mis-
represented his interestc" 
(4) At no point in the record is there any 
indication that at this meeting Mr« McKinley asked the 
appellant questions over his protest or against his wishes 
(Tr.71-74,82-86,87-89). 
Finally, appellant contends that both his broken 
English and Mr. McKinleyss failure to make a written report 
of what transpired should have been enough to justify 
exclusion of his testimony• This contention ignores the 
fact that although English is not the appellant's native 
tongue he was at the time of this incident a student at 
Weber State College (TrdlS) and attended classes taught 
in English. Moreover, although it might have proved helpful 
had Mre McKinley made a report of this incidentr he was 
under no obligation to do so* His recollection of exact 
phrasing or lack thereof was a consideration for the jury 
as it always is in weighing the credibility of witnesses. 
Certainly an imperfect memory of a witness is no reason for 
excluding his testimony altogether. 
Respondent submits that the trial court correctly 
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admitted the testimony of witness McKinley. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED THE BAGS OF 
MARIJUANA INTO EVIDENCE. 
On the day of this incident, Messrsc O'Keefe and 
McKinley were called by the manager of the Warren Apartments 
to come and help them determine the contents of the suspicious 
looking bags in room 119 * When they arrived they observed the 
plastic bag on the countertop in the roonu Only after 
determining it was marijuana did they look around the room 
for more contraband* 
Appellant cited Mapp ve Ohio, 367 UCSC 643, 6 L*Ed« 
2d 1081, 81 S.Cte 1684 (1961), as authority for his claim 
that this evidence should have been suppressed* Mapp stands 
for the proposition that evidence obtained by unconstitutional 
searches and seizures is inadmissible at trial in a state 
courte Respondent has no quarrel with the soundness of this 
proposition but maintains it does not apply under the facts 
of this casec Respondent submits that there was no illegal 
search and seizure of evidence because there was no search and 
seizure in the first place* 
-14-
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According to State vc Simpson, 541 P*2d 1114 
(Utah 1975)f the Utah Supreme Court is "obliged to view the 
evidence/ and whatever inferences may be fairly and reason-* 
ably drawn therefrom0 e * *n IcL at 1115. Applying this 
doctrine to the instant casef it is clear that Djafar Tawakolx 
paid rent for the last two days he was therer July 1 and July 
29 1975, and that he left for Persia July 3r 1975r in the morning,. 
Further9 there is evidence that he turned in some keys when he 
paid the assistant manager his two days1 rent on July 2r 1975* 
Thus? having paid only two days1 rentP he gave up possession 
of the room at the end of July 2f 1975. Although some of 
his possessions remained in the roomf he had no "possessory 
rights" to the apartment for himself or to transfer to the 
appellant or anyone else, as appellant claims * Thereforef 
it was not improper for the manager of the apartment to enter 
the room and inventory those items left behind,, Djafar had 
given up his tenancy to it* When the maid discovered the 
plastic baggie she put it on the countertop and went to get 
the two officers in the building. Furthermoref the first 
time McKinley and OfKeefe saw this plastic bag it was in 
plain view. According to State y« Allred, 16 Utah 2d 41f 
395 P.2d 535 (1964)9 where an item is observed in plain 
view* no search is made by observing it* "Under such 
circumstances, where no search is required the constitutional 
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guaranty is not applicable•,f Id«, 16 Utah 2d at 43/ 
395 P.2d at 537* See also State v, Sims, 30 Utah 2d 251, 
516 Po2d 354 (1973)* Also, the Utah Supreme Court in 
State Vc Martinez, 28 Utah 2d 80, 498 P,2d 651 (1972), held 
that where there was a seizure of that which is in plain 
sight, there is no searcho 
Therefore, Officer OfKeefe and Mrc McKinley did 
not make any search at all of the first bag of marijuana* 
Respondent submits that there was no search for this marijuana 
because it was in plain view and because the two men were there 
by invitation of the manager who had lawful possession of the 
apartment as of July 3, 1975, a fact suported by the appellantps 
own testimonyc 
As to the second bag of marijuana, it was properly 
introduced into evidence also because the search for it was 
permitted by the manager of the apartments, the person in 
lawful possession of the room, and because Mr* OfKeefe was 
obligated to do so in view of the fact that the presence of 
the known contraband raised suspicions about the rest of the 
items left in the room* In other words, even had the manager 
not been in lawful possession of the apartment, Officer 
O'Keefe would have been obligated to investigate suspicious 
circumstancesc Terry v. Ohio, 392 U*S* 1, 20 LrEd.2d 889, 
\;vV'V. -i6« : ^ Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
88 SeCt. 1868 (1968). Terry stands for the proposition 
that a police officer can and should investigate 
suspicious circumstances in order to prevent or curtail 
criminal activity*, Appellant claims that the officers 
had no right to search the personalty in room 119r but 
this claim overlooks the fact that so far as the manager 
knew, the items were abandoned and thereby under the 
manager's controle Respondent submits that Terry v. 
OhiOy supra, is controlling and that Officer OfKeefe and 
Mr. McKinley were obligated and entitled to search. The 
second bag of marijuana was properly admitted into evidence 
at trial* 
Finally, the search for the marijuana after it 
had been removed from the counter in OfKeefers and 
McKinleyfs absence is also permissible under Terry v r Ohio, 
supray because it was clear that someone had taken possession 
of the contraband, an unlawful act which required immediate 
investigation* 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that whether a 
search and seizure is reasonable is for the trial court to 
determine in the first instance. State v. Allred, supra; 
State v. Louden, 15 Utah 2d 64, 387 P.2d 240 (1963); State 
Vc Sims, supra. On appeal the evidence must be viewed in 
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the light most favorable to the jury verdict* State v. 
Berchtold, 11 Utah 2d 208, 351 Pe2d 183 (1960); State 
Vo Danks, 10 Utah 2d 162, 350 P.2d 106 (1959). In other 
words, unless there is a clear showing of unreasonableness, 
the decision of the lower court must be affirmed. State y» 
Romero, 554 Pc2d 216 (Utah 1976). 
Respondent submits that the contraband was 
properly and permissibly seized and was properly admitted 
into evidence by the trial court* 
CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, based upon the arguments and 
authority presented herein, it is urged that this Court 
affirmed appellantps conviction. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
WILLIAM W. BARRETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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